Perhaps it is worthwhile to take a further look at this term "knowing." In the example of Climate Change, let's suppose that Man Made Climate Change (MMCC) is "True": that it is factual that emissions from human industrial activities are responsible for some level of change in the climate of the earth - either making it more chaotic, or resulting in the increase in temperature, or both.
Now it seems to be me that there are several schools of people in relation to this truth. There are those who truly know this truth - these would be the scientists who have applied the scientific method and demonstrated the truth. Then there are those who "simply" or "accidentally" know this truth - while they believe in MMCC, they do so for reasons other than the demonstration of the truth - such a person might have a correct premise (the temperature of the earth is increasing) and a correct conclusion (man-made emissions are causing the temperature of the earth to increase), but they have not demonstrated the connection between the two. There are also those who falsely know this truth. A good example of this type is someone who argues "MMCC is true because a preponderance of scientists believe it to be true" - majority opinion has no bearing on truth. This type has an incorrect premise (majorities are correct when it comes to scientific opinion), but end up at the right conclusion anyway. Nevertheless, in our overall example, even those who falsely know truth, know truth. On the other hand, there are three corresponding schools: there are those who truly do not know this truth - such as scientists who have applied the scientific method and have erred in their experiments or conclusions. Likewise there are those who simply or accidentally do not know the truth - their rejection is based on factors other than the demonstration. Finally, there are those who falsely do not know the truth - that is, both their rejection of the truth and their reasons for it are flawed.
Now, it should be obvious that in any population, the number who truly know the truth is likely to be very small. In fact, it is likely that only specialists will ever be in this camp, and then it is likely only a minority of the specialists themselves will truly know the truth.
For the example of MMCC, and of course, presuming that it is true, of the other two types - those who simply or accidentally know the truth, and those who falsely know the truth, the adherents of Scientism fall into the latter camp.
But does this discount the knowledge of truth of those who either simply or falsely know the truth, or does it vindicate those who do not know the truth? I argue that it does not. For, in a semiotic sense, our means of knowing the truth may be one of the three posited conditions, but if the truth stands external to ourselves, then the intermediary, in a static end-state, is irrelevant. All three types of individual stand in the same relation to the truth.
What is different, however, is how that truth becomes actionable in the hands of the three different types of "knowers".
No comments:
Post a Comment